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Using panel data for 188 countries over the period 1970-2002 this paper empirically analyzes 
the influence of the IMF and the World Bank on voting patterns in the UN General Assembly. 
Countries receiving adjustment programs and larger non-concessional loans from the World 
Bank vote more frequently in line with the average G7 country. The same is true for countries 
obtaining non-concessional IMF programs. Regarding voting coincidence with the US, World 
Bank (concessional and non-concessional) loans have a significant impact, while the IMF has 
not. These results are robust to the inclusion of control variables and method of estimation. 
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1. Introduction 
Ever since their inception, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have been 
accused of being a tool of their major shareholders, and especially the US.
1 Woods (2003) 
clearly documents that the US virtually controls major decisions at IMF and World Bank; 
Fratianni and Pattison (2003) summarize evidence showing that the G7 are in full control of 
the IMF on the big issues and that staff autonomy is restricted to areas which are of marginal 
interest to its shareholders. In the words of Rieffel (2003: 28-29), “The IMF is an instrument 
of the G-7 countries. There is no example that comes easily to mind of a position taken by the 
IMF on any systematic issue without the tacit, if not explicit, support of the United States and 
the other G-7 countries.”
2 The recent empirical literature on political influences on the IMF 
shows that developing countries indeed get better terms from the IMF, when they have closer 
ties with the US, as measured by their voting behavior in the UN General Assembly (Thacker 
1999, Barro and Lee 2005, Stone 2002, Vreeland, 2005, Dreher and Jensen 2007). Similarly, 
the US interferes with World Bank policies when its national interests are at stake (Gwin 
1997). Schoulz (1982) documents that the US frequently influences the World Bank’s 
“interests” in certain loans. In some cases, the Bank even violated its charter to satisfy US 
politicians. Consequently, Frey and Schneider (1986) find the distribution of Bank loans to be 
dominated by political considerations; Fleck and Kilby (2001) show that World Bank lending 
significantly reflects US influence. More recently, Faini and Grilli (2004) report that World 
Bank (and IMF) lending is influenced by US and EU. 
However, while there is ample evidence that the G7 countries control the flow of IMF 
and World Bank money, it has never been investigated whether the recipients of this money 
adapt their behavior to please the keepers of the funds. This is the question our paper deals 
with. Specifically, we investigate empirically whether IMF and World Bank involvement 
increases the probability that a country votes in line with G7 countries in the UN General 
Assembly. 
The question addressed here is related to the literature on the impact of bilateral aid on 
UN General Assembly voting patterns. A number of previous studies investigate this question 
                                                 
1 See Gisselquist (1981), Loxley (1986) and Barnebeck Andersen, Hansen and Markussen (2004) for anecdotal 
evidence. 
2 For example, a report for the US House of Foreign Affairs Committee concludes that the United States prevents 
for political reasons certain countries from borrowing IMF money, and that other nations exert their influence in 
a similar (but less rigorous) manner (Kwitny 1983).   3
(see section 2). Clearly, as compared to the Security Council, the power of the General 
Assembly is limited, and not all of its decisions are likely to be important for G7 countries. 
Still, there is ample evidence that G7 governments place some weight on the outcome of 
General Assembly votes. This is particularly true for the US. As has been pointed out by the  
US Department of State (1985), examining UN votes makes it possible “to make judgments 
about whose values and views are harmonious with our own, whose policies are consistently 
opposed to ours, and whose practices fall in between.” A report from the same department in 
2000 states “a country’s behavior at the United Nations is always relevant to its bilateral 
relationship with the United States, a point the Secretary of State regularly makes in letters of 
instruction to new U.S. ambassadors” (quoted in Barnebeck Andersen, Harr and Tarp 2004: 
15). It has been argued that the “State Department … places high value on the employment of 
foreign aid to … swing critical votes in international bodies” (Black 1968: 19). Thacker 
(1999: 54) cites a memo to the director of the Food for Peace Program noting that “at critical 
moments in the world’s recent history, the U.S. ‘bought’ votes subtly and indirectly to support 
its stand in the General Assembly.” Bennis (1997) claims that “U.S. influence in (and often 
control of) the UN comes in the form of coercing the organization to take one or another 
position, or to reject some other position, or pressuring a country or countries to vote a certain 
way in the General Assembly.” As a specific example of US pressure on the Assembly, 
Bennis describes the US effort to overturning the 1975 resolution identifying political 
Zionism as a form of racism and racial discrimination. According to Bennis, “U.S. diplomats 
took off, criss-crossing the globe using Gulf War-tested methods of bribing and threatening 
other nations to win support for the repeal effort.”  
Overall, there is reason to believe that aid is not only given to help countries in 
economic distress but to achieve the donor’s political targets. In fact, since the late 1940s 
every US administration considered foreign aid to be important in achieving foreign policy 
goals (Ruttan 1996). It has even been claimed that the primary purpose of US economic 
assistance is in promoting overall US policy objectives (Zimmerman 1993). According to 
Morgenthau (1962: 302), “the transfer of money and services from one government to another 
performs here the function of a price paid for political services rendered or to be rendered.”   
In summary, G7 countries are in control of IMF and Bank decisions, and can thereby 
use the international organizations to bribe or reward recipient countries. Moreover, G7 
countries place some weight on General Assembly votes and there is also evidence that 
certain states in the Assembly are very susceptible to pressure (Keohane 1966). We therefore 
expect Fund and Bank involvement to influence voting patterns in the Assembly.   4
Our paper combines two strands of the literature and extends previous work on foreign 
aid and voting patterns in the UN General Assembly. As previous empirical studies did not 
cover extended periods of time, are inconclusive, and usually focus on US influences only, the 
analysis of foreign aid on voting patterns is interesting in its own right. However, the main 
contribution of this paper is to analyze for the first time, whether G7 countries employ the 
IMF and the World Bank to change the voting behavior of developing countries (or reward 
countries for voting with them). What we find is, basically, that IMF and World Bank indeed 
influence voting behavior in the Assembly. Countries with IMF and World Bank programs 
tend to vote more frequently in line with the G7 countries. The same is true for countries 
receiving larger non-concessional loans from the World Bank. We employ Extreme Bounds 
Analysis to test for the robustness of our results. While the basic results for IMF and World 
Bank hold, bilateral aid from G7 countries is not robustly related to voting in the General 
Assembly. 
The organization of the paper is as follows. The next section provides a short overview 
of previous empirical work on bilateral and multilateral aid, and voting in the UN General 
Assembly. The third section discusses methodological issues. The fourth develops our 
hypotheses, whereas the fifth describes the data. In the sixth section we present the results of 
our analysis, while we discuss variations to our estimation approach in section seven. Finally, 
we provide a short summary. 
 
2. Literature Review 
The relevant literature can be divided in two parts. One studies the impact of voting on IMF 
and World Bank behavior; the other investigates the impact of foreign aid on voting.
3
On the first point, Thacker (1999) was the first to test the hypothesis that conclusion of 
IMF programs depends on countries’ voting behavior in the UN General Assembly. He 
employs two variables – one indicating a country’s political agreement with the US, the other 
reflecting movement in political alignment. According to his results for the period 1985-94, 
political proximity has no statistically significant impact when serial correlation is taken into 
                                                 
3 The literature on the determinants of voting decisions is not confined to the UN General Assembly. Levitt 
(1996) and Rothenberg and Sanders (2000), e.g., analyze voting patterns in the US Congress. Boockmann (2003) 
looks at voting in the International Labour Organization, the focus of Eldar (2004) is on the UN Security Council 
and General Assembly, international courts, the WTO, and the International Whaling Commission. A general 
survey of the determinants of aid allocation is Neumayer (2003). We do not discuss this literature here.   5
account. However, a movement to the US significantly increases the probability of receiving 
an IMF program. The results also show that the impact of a movement towards the US on the 
probability to obtain IMF programs does not depend on the initial position. A movement 
towards the US position is correlated with IMF involvement regardless of the initial political 
stance of the recipient country. Interestingly, a country starting at a point very distant from the 
US has a much better chance of receiving a program when moving towards the US position 
than a country that is closely allied with the US, but slightly moves away from it.
4
Oatley and Yackee (2004) show for the period 1985-1998 that the IMF offers larger 
loans to closer US allies, as measured by UN voting patterns. However, this result is not 
completely robust to the underlying specification. Barro and Lee (2005) employ averages for 
the voting behavior of France, Germany and the UK, and an individual variable for the US. 
As it turns out, only voting with the European countries significantly increases the amount of 
IMF loans disbursed over the period 1975-2000. 
Edwards (2003) also tests whether voting similarity with the USA in the General 
Assembly influences the probability of being under an IMF program. His results for 106 
countries with programs in effect between 1979 and 1995 show that US alliance does not 
increase a country’s probability of having such a program. According to Stone (2003) who 
analyzed monthly data on 53 African countries for 1990-2000, enforcement of IMF 
conditionality depends on US foreign aid, membership in post-colonial international 
institutions, and UN General Assembly voting in line with France. Dreher and Jensen (2007) 
find for a sample of 206 letters of intent over the period 1997-2003 that the number of 
conditions on an IMF loan depends on a borrowing country’s voting pattern in the UN 
General Assembly. Closer allies of the G7 receive IMF loans with fewer conditions. 
Regarding the World Bank, Barnebeck Andersen, Hansen and Markussen (2004) 
analyze a panel of 60 countries over the period 1991-2000. According to their results, 
countries voting with the US on votes classified as important by the State Department are 
significantly more likely to receive International Development Agency loan commitments. 
 
                                                 
4 Similarly, Alesina and Dollar (2000) analyze the impact of voting on bilateral aid. Results from their panel 
analysis show that countries voting with Japan receive more bilateral aid, while voting with the US has no 
impact when controlled for US interests in the Middle East. Voting with other major donor countries has no 
impact. Other papers examining the impact of voting in the UN General Assembly on bilateral aid include Ball 
and Johnson (1996), Boschini and Olofsgard (2001), Alesina and Weder (2002), and Fleck and Kilby (2005). 
Kilby (2006) employs UN voting patterns in his analysis of donor influence on the Asian Development Bank.   6
Table 1: Studies of Voting in the UN General Assembly and Aid 
Study  Period Sample Main  Focus Result




1961-68 126 countries Voting with USA Aid increases voting 
coincidence
Rai (1972) 1961-65 66 countries Voting with USA Aid increases voting 
coincidence
Wittkopf (1973) 1962-67 96 countries Voting with OECD 
countries
Aid increases voting 
coincidence








1988 146 countries Voting with USA Aid has no impact 
on voting
Lundborg (1998) 1948-79 non-communist 
UN members
Voting with USA Aid increases voting 
coincidence
Wang (1999) 1984-93 65 countries Voting with USA Aid increases voting 
coincidence
Morey and Lai 
(2003)
1950-91 all UN members Voting with USA Aid has no impact 
on voting  
 
The second question, the impact of foreign aid on voting, has also received much 
attention. Table 1 summarizes the main results of those studies. As can be seen, empirical 
findings are, however, inconclusive. Some studies conclude that aid is ineffective in 
influencing voting behavior, while others find the expected positive relation between bilateral 
aid and voting similarity. 
With respect to the US, Kato (1969), Kegley and Hook (1991), Sexton and Decker 
(1992) and Morey and Lai (2003) belong to the first group. Bernstein and Alpert (1971), Rai 
(1972, 1980), Wittkopf (1973), Lundborg (1998) and Wang (1999) belong to the second. 
While earlier studies cover rather short periods of time and mostly rely on bivariate   7
regressions or correlation analysis, the majority of the more recent contributions use panel 
methods over longer horizons. Rai (1980) reports of generally low coincidence between US 
and African as well as Middle Eastern or South Asian votes; coincidence between US and 
Latin American votes is much higher. Russett (1967), employing factor analysis, shows that 
regional clusters are most important for voting alignment. According to Kim and Russett 
(1996), today the North-South divide explains a huge share of variation in voting behavior, 
while it has been the East-West divide during the Cold War.
5 Focusing on votes that have 
been classified by the US State Department as being important, Wang (1999) finds for 65 
countries between 1984 and 1993 that a change in the level of US aid significantly increases 
voting coincidence, while the coefficient of the level itself is insignificant. A dummy for 
democratic countries, a country’s military strength, and its level of economic development did 
not significantly influence voting patterns. Lundborg (1998) focuses on relative support for 
the USA and the Soviet Union between 1984-1979. Estimating simultaneous regressions, he 
finds that both countries employed aid to stimulate international political support, whereas aid 
recipients allocated their support to stimulate aid. 
Donor countries other than the US and the Soviet Union have less frequently been 
investigated. An early exception is Wittkopf (1973), focusing on the sixteen members of the 
OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and the Soviet Bloc for the years 1962 
and 1967. As results of his correlation analysis show, however, only US foreign aid is 
significantly associated with voting patterns. 
 
2. Measuring voting coincidence 
The main question we address in this paper is whether or not IMF and/or World Bank 
programs and loans affect the voting behavior of recipient countries in the UN General 
Assembly. In analyzing this question, we face several problems.  
First, we need to establish as of how to measure voting coincidence in the UN General 
Assembly. There are several possibilities. Thacker (1999), among others, codes votes in 
agreement with the US as 1, votes in disagreement as 0, and abstentions or absences as 0.5.
6 
                                                 
5 To the contrary, Voeten (2000) finds that the position of countries still corresponds more closely to their Cold 
War East-West dimension than to the North-South dimension. 
6 Similarly, Gartzke and Jo (2002) and Morey and Lai (2003) code voting coincidence between -1 and 1, with 
abstentions being in between compliance and non-compliance. Russett (1967) and Rai (1972) code each country 
either 2 (yes), 1 (abstain or absent), or 0 (negative). Focusing on abstentions might be important as donors might   8
Wittkopf (1973), Sexton and Decker (1992) and Barro and Lee (2005) employed the fraction 
of times a country votes the same as the country of interest (either both voting yes, both 
voting no, both voting abstentions, or both being absent), Kegley and Hoock (1991) simply 
discarded abstentions or absences.
7 In any case, the resulting numbers are then divided by the 
total number of votes in each year. We concentrate on the method proposed by Thacker 
(1999) for both theoretical and statistical reasons. The difference between the three 
approaches lies in the way they weigh abstentions or absences, giving it a weight of 0, 0.5 or 1 
in case the potential donor country does vote. Of course, any of these weights is arbitrary, but 
we prefer not opting for a corner solution and hence stick to the definition of Thacker (1999) 
in which a weight of 0.5 is used. Furthermore, from a statistical point of view this produces a 
dependent variable with a nicely bell-shaped distribution (as opposed to the other two 
definitions where the tails of the distribution do become rather fat). Hence, it is less likely that 
our results will be driven by extreme observations. Nevertheless, we test the robustness of our 
results by also employing the methods of Kegley and Hoock (1991) and Barro and Lee 
(2005).  
In addition to the data based on voting behavior in the same year only – as is the case 
with the above three definitions – we also calculate a moving average of the dependent 
variable. It is quite likely that proximity to the G7 countries only evolves slowly over time, 
and voting behavior of previous years might therefore give important information about a 
country’s current position. Previous years enter the moving average with the weights 0.45, 
0.25, 0.15, 0.10, and 0.05.  
An important issue in previous studies has been the question which UN General 
Assembly votes to include in either definition of voting coincidence. While the majority of the 
literature simply includes all votes, some researchers focus on “important” votes only. 
Clearly, the amount of effort a country puts on influencing others will depend on the 
importance of a vote. It has been pointed out in the introduction that not all votes in the 
General Assembly are likely to be of great importance to the US and other G7 countries. 
Focusing the analysis on a sub-set of votes might thus be superior. However, inclusion of all 
votes has also been defended. Wittkopf (1973) states that none of the alternatives focusing on 
                                                                                                                                                          
bribe governments not only to comply, but also to avoid non-compliance (Zimmermann 1993, Palmer et al. 
2002, Hawes 2004).  
7 Yet an alternative method has been suggested by Brams and O’Leary (1970) and employed, e.g., by Wittkopf 
(1973). They subtract the expected agreement from actual agreement and divide by the former. Expected 
agreement is based on the actual distribution of votes on each General Assembly roll call vote.   9
“important” votes only is preferable to the general approach. Wittkopf replicates his overall 
results including only those votes on which the USA and the Soviet Union disagreed, finding 
that the results do not differ substantially from the analysis including all votes. Similarly, he 
replicates the previous analysis of Russett (1967), and also finds no substantial differences 
between “important” votes and all votes. 
Moreover, labeling issues as being important is highly subjective (e.g. Kegley and 
McGowan 1981). At least for the United States this could potentially be solved in employing 
the categorization provided by the State Department. The transmission of US foreign policy 
preferences from the State Department to the World Bank and the IMF is not, however, 
necessarily a direct one (Thacker 1999), as it is mainly the Treasury controlling IMF and 
World Bank (Kahler 1990).
8 The State Department’s preferences might thus not give a good 
indication as to actual lobbying efforts.  
For two reasons the main focus of this paper is on all votes, including non-key votes 
also. First, the classification into key votes and non-key votes is not available for countries 
other than the US. And second, the US State Department classifies those votings since 1983 
only. Our study deals with a broader range of countries and a longer period of time (1970-
2002). Nevertheless, we provide an analysis employing only key votes for comparison. 
Some of the previous studies exclude nearly unanimous votes, as it is unlikely that 
countries bribe on those. Clearly, however, the threshold above which votes are to be 
excluded is purely subjective. In our robustness tests we discard votes where more than 80 
percent of the countries agreed on the outcome.  
Voting alignment is also likely to depend on the underlying topic. Voting behavior of 
each country on every roll call vote in the UN General Assembly since 1946 has been 
documented by Voeten (2004). With almost 20 percent of all votes during our sample, 
decisions related to Israel account for the by far biggest share of all.
9 We want to ensure that 
our results are not driven by this. In addition to the above definitions of the voting variable, 
we thus also construct a variable where decisions concerning topics related to Israel are 
excluded. 
 
                                                 
8 See also Ruttan (1996). 
9 Other topics which received relatively large attention in the UN General Assembly include ‘apartheid’, ‘arms’ 
and ‘nuclear power’. However, each of these took a share of only 9 percent in total voting. Results do not appear 
to be driven by one of these specific topics.    10














































































Thacker 1.00 0.62 0.54 0.94 0.68 0.96 0.95
Barro-Lee 5096 1.00 0.96 0.91 0.73 0.98 0.95
Kegley-Hoock 5096 5096 1.00 0.90 0.69 0.98 0.94
 
# Observations 5096 5096 5096 4828 3315 5096 5096  
Notes: variables are corrected for country- and time-specific effects. 
Sample covers up to 188 countries between 1970-2002. 
 
The bottom row of Table 2 reports the number of observations available for the 
various dependent variables in case we focus on an artificially constructed G7 donor country 
(see below). The correlation coefficients – after having corrected for both recipient-country- 
and time-specific effects – are in the upper part. Our annualized sample of up to 188 countries 
covering 1970-2002 includes around 5’000 observations. Only in case we concentrate on US 
key votes, the number of country-years drops to about 3’300.  
Overall, the correlations among most of the various definitions are rather high. 
Excluding nearly unanimous votes from any of the three baseline definitions, i.e. Thacker, 
Barro-Lee or Kegley-Hoock, leads to a correlation of 0.96 or above. Correlation of the 
moving average versions with these three definitions also always exceeds 0.9. Even leaving 
out Israeli topics hardly affects voting coincidence; the correlation coefficient is at least 0.95. 
Hence, it is rather unlikely that our results will depend on issues like these. Nevertheless, we 
return to this below.  
It is more likely that our results will depend on focusing on key votes only, and on 
how we include abstentions and absences. The correlation between the three baseline 
definitions and the same definitions including only US key votes is still high, however, 
amounting to roughly 0.7. This is in line with the results of Voeten (2000), showing that a 
country’s position in the Assembly is independent of the importance of the issues.  
The lowest correlations are found between the three ways of dealing with abstentions 
or absences. For instance, the correlation between our main voting index according to the 
definition of Thacker and those according to the definition of Kegley and Hook is only 0.54.   11
It will thus be important to test for the robustness of our findings using these alternative 
definitions as to deal with abstentions or absences. 
  The next issue concerns choosing the relevant donor country (or vote of reference) for 
a recipient country. The literature assumes preferences of G7 countries to be sufficiently 
homogenous to attribute domination of IMF and World Bank to this group (Bird and 
Rowlands 2001). Most of the literature focuses on the US as the potential donor. However, 
measuring voting compliance with only the US or each G7 country individually might bias 
the results of the empirical analysis against finding support for the political pressure 
hypothesis. As the G7 countries rarely all vote in line among themselves, their individual 
pressure on the international organizations might neutralize them. As one example, there is 
evidence that France was trying to buy votes (in the Security Council) in order to oppose the 
Second Gulf War, while the US was paying for support (Eldar 2004). Another case in point is 
the contested bid by Germany and Japan to become permanent members of the UN Security 
Council, which has been opposed by other members of the Security Council. To take this into 
account, we do not only analyze compliance with each G7 country individually, but also 
construct a variable reflecting the average vote of the G7 countries.
10 This has been done by 
Barro and Lee (2005) for France, Germany and the UK, and by Neumayer (2003) for all DAC 
donors. We weigh each G7 countries’ vote with its quota in the Fund to take its voting power 
in the international organizations into account. 
 
Table 3: Correlation of voting coincidence among G7 countries 
CAN FRA GBR DEU ITA JPN USA  G7
 
Canada (CAN) 0.95 0.96 0.92 0.99 0.97 0.75 0.95
France (FRA) 0.98 0.91 0.97 0.91 0.71 0.96
UK (GBR) 0.92 0.97 0.92 0.77 0.99
Germany (DEU) 0.93 0.89 0.71 0.92
Italy (ITA) 0.96 0.74 0.97
Japan (JPN) 0.73 0.92
United States (USA) 0.79
G7  
Notes: variables are corrected for country- and time-specific effects. Except for Germany (which became 
member in 1973 (4723 observations)), each sample covers 188 countries, 1970-2002 (5096 observations). 
 
                                                 
10 According to Pallansch and Zinni (1996), G7 voting patterns tend to congregate together in a Euclidian space. 
However, Alesina and Dollar (2000) find that voting blocks in the UN General Assembly are sufficiently 
distinguishable for the US, France, Japan and the UK to use them separately in econometric analysis.   12
Table 3 presents the correlation of voting coincidence among G7 countries. The last 
column shows how voting of each G7 country according to the definition of Thacker is 
correlated with the “voting with the G7 countries” variable. In general, these correlations are 
rather high. Despite the fact that the US gets the largest weight (due to its high quota with the 
Fund) in our G7 average, the only exception appears to be the correlation between these two. 
These findings are confirmed by the correlation coefficients between each pair of G7 
countries. Again the correlation coefficients with the US are relatively low. Hence, with 
respect to the other six G7 members – and in particular Canada, France, the UK, and Italy – 
there is a high degree of voting coincidence.  
 
Table 4: Voting coincidence across different regions in the world 
 #Cnt #Obs  CAN DEU FRA GBR ITA JPN USA  G7
Entire world 188 5096 0.45 0.42 0.36 0.35 0.44 0.48 0.20 0.36
Europe, Western 19 507 0.73 0.71 0.64 0.65 0.73 0.71 0.46 0.65
Europe, Central & Eastern 20 414 0.59 0.59 0.53 0.51 0.59 0.60 0.34 0.52
North America 4 127 0.54 0.50 0.44 0.43 0.52 0.58 0.26 0.43
Central & Middle America 8 253 0.55 0.52 0.45 0.45 0.54 0.58 0.31 0.46
South America 8 264 0.57 0.53 0.46 0.46 0.55 0.60 0.30 0.46
Caribbean 13 368 0.53 0.50 0.45 0.43 0.52 0.56 0.30 0.44
Asia, Central & Western 9 118 0.60 0.60 0.55 0.54 0.60 0.62 0.37 0.54
Asia, Eastern & Southern 24 659 0.52 0.48 0.43 0.41 0.50 0.56 0.25 0.41
Oceania 14 242 0.61 0.57 0.52 0.52 0.60 0.62 0.39 0.52
Africa 53 1641 0.51 0.48 0.43 0.41 0.50 0.55 0.27 0.42
Middle East 16 503 0.52 0.48 0.42 0.41 0.50 0.55 0.27 0.42  
Notes: sample covers 1970-2002. Regional classification is based upon the World Factbook of the CIA: 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/fields/2144.html 
 
Table 4 gives an impression of voting coincidence across regions (over the period 
1970-2002). Not surprisingly, of all General Assembly members, Western European countries 
(other than G7 members) are most likely to vote in line with G7 countries. Countries in 
Eastern and Southern Asia, Africa and the Middle East are least likely to vote with the G7. 
Again voting coincidence with the US is – independent of the region of focus – the lowest of 
all. With only one exception, Japan has the highest correlation with each region separately. In 
case of Western Europe, Japan is surpassed by both Canada and Italy. 
 3. Towards a baseline model 
The main question we address in this paper is whether or not IMF and World Bank programs 
and loans affect the voting behavior in the UN General Assembly. To answer that, we face 
several problems.  
One of the main challenges in empirical analysis when there is no established 
benchmark is coming up with a reliable model. We employ a general-to-specific method to 
construct such a baseline model. In selecting potential variables for this baseline we employ a 
number of hypotheses put forward in the literature with respect to voting coincidence in the 
UN General Assembly. Once the baseline model is determined, we concentrate on testing our 
main hypotheses (Section 5).  
3.1 Hypotheses for the baseline model 
Hagan (1989) has pointed out that the political direction of governments might be important 
for voting in the UN General Assembly. Socialist countries are probably likely to share 
similar views on a range of topics. The same is true for central or right-wing governments. In 
addition to political proximity, a similar culture might lead to similar voting behavior (for a 
discussion of the argument see Voeten 2000). Particularly, Thacker (1999) has pointed out 
that, as countries become more democratic, they may also alter their UN voting behavior to 
reflect these changes. Democracies rarely fight wars against each other (Doyle 1986) and 
probably have interests closer to the G7 countries than dictatorships do. They agree, e.g., on 
principles like free speech, private property and elected representation (Wang 1999) and 
might thus form an alliance of liberal democracies against more dictatorial regimes.  
Voeten (2000) provides empirical evidence. According to his results, the Western-
Non-Western dimension is most important in explaining voting behavior in the General 
Assembly – with Western countries being democracies and Non-Western countries mostly 
being non-democratic for the major part of the sample period. 
Hypothesis 1: Cultural and political proximity increases voting coincidence. 
We measure cultural and political proximity with the G7 countries with an index of 
political rights and civil liberties, the change of that index, the rule of law, perceived 
corruption and bureaucratic quality.
11 We also include a dummy that is one if a country’s 
                                                 
11 Appendix I lists all variables with their definitions and sources.   14
government has the same political color as the respective G7 country, i.e. both are either left- 
or right-wing governments. 
 
A country’s economic and political strength and its access to alternative capital sources might 
also be important for voting behavior. Arguably, politically and economically strong countries 
with easy access to private capital are less likely to accept bribes and are thus less likely to 
vote in line with G7 countries. Dependence might be higher in times of crises and political 
instability, or when private capital is less freely flowing in general. Highly indebted countries 
frequently have no alternative to IMF and World Bank loans, increasing their dependence. 
Natural resources and other potential revenues decrease dependence: 
Hypothesis 2: Countries depending on foreign support are more likely to vote in 
line with G7 countries. 
We employ a number of variables to proxy for dependence on foreign support: total 
aid received (in percent of GNI); the change in total received aid; a composite indicator of 
national capability; total external debt (in percent of GDP); the change in total external debt; a 
variable measuring ethnic tensions; the rate of inflation; current account balance (in percent of 
GDP); overall budget balance (in percent of GDP); GDP per capita; and real GDP growth.
12  
 
Other variables potentially important for UN General Assembly voting patterns are 
international trade and foreign direct investment. With greater interdependence among 
countries, cooperation is more likely (e.g. Oneal and Russett 1999). This is because 
interdependence might create similar preferences on certain topics. Moreover, strong 
interdependence can create fears of loosing access to markets. According to Keohane (1967), 
dependence on trade thus increases a country’s responsiveness to external pressure. Foreign 
trade flows are a potential measure of foreign influence (Stone 2003), and the same is true for 
foreign direct investment. Economic ties might thus increase the probability of voting with the 
partner country.  
However, strong economic ties with developed countries might as well create feelings 
of exploitation and could thus give rise to voting against these countries (Kim and Russett 
                                                 
12 In case the variables are used in both levels and first-differences, the level variable has been lagged by one 
period. This alleviates the interpretation of the estimated coefficients. The qualitative conclusions are not 
affected by this.   15
1996). The impact of trade and foreign direct investment on voting patterns is thus a priori 
ambiguous: 
Hypothesis 3a: Trade flows and FDI increase the probability that a country votes 
in line with its partner country. 
Hypothesis 3b: Trade flows and FDI reduce the probability that a country votes 
in line with its partner country. 
These hypotheses are tested with exports and imports from the respective G7 country 
(in percent of GDP). Unfortunately, we cannot test for the impact of bilateral inflows and 
outflows of foreign direct investment, as inclusion of those variables would reduce the sample 
size well below 30 countries. 
 
The literature review of the previous section gives raise to in particular one additional 
hypothesis regarding the determinants of countries’ voting behavior in the UN General 
Assembly which is related to our main hypothesis. This final hypothesis is directly derived 
from this literature: 
Hypothesis 4: Bilateral foreign aid, or changes in aid, increases the probability 
that a recipient country votes in line with the donor. 
We employ net grants (in percent of GDP) from the respective G7 country and the 
changes thereof to test whether bilateral aid impacts on voting behavior.
13  
  
3.2 Selection of the baseline model 
The regression is a pooled time-series cross-section analysis (with yearly data). The analysis 
covers the time period 1970-2002 and extends to a maximum of 188 countries for our 
dependent variable. Since some of the data are not available for all countries or years, the 
panel data are unbalanced and the number of observations depends on the choice of 
explanatory variables. We find significant fixed country and time effects in most 
specifications and therefore include them in our regressions. (However, the coefficients of the 
                                                 
13 We also included loans by the respective G7 country or countries and food aid, but did not have a sufficient 
number of observations for meaningful regression analysis.   16
country and time dummies are not reported in the tables.) As a consequence, we cannot 
include variables that do not change over time or are the same for all countries.
14  
In our first step of coming up with a suitable baseline model we apply a general-to-
specific procedure. We include all variables derived from the hypotheses formulated above 
and then delete that variable with the lowest level of significance. With the remaining 
variables, this procedure is repeated until all coefficients are significant at the 5 percent level. 
In a second step we check whether any of the previously deleted variables would render 
significant when added again. These significant variables are step by step included. The two 
steps are repeated until a final model converges. 
As was to be expected, the results of this procedure are to a certain extent donor-
country specific. Table 5 shows that we do have some evidence in favor of the first three of 
our hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 on cultural and political proximity appears to be mainly backed 
up by our measure of democracy. More democratic societies tend to vote in line with G7 
countries. A number of times we also find significant effects of the political color variable and 
corruption. Changes in democracy and bureaucratic quality each only matter for one particular 
donor country (Japan and, respectively, Germany).  
With respect to hypothesis 2, we find very strong evidence that national capability 
lowers the probability of a country to vote in line with any of the G7 members. Note that this 
composite indicator of national capability is a measure of power based upon six indicators: 
military expenditure, military personnel, energy consumption, iron and steel production, 
urban population, and total population. Hence, as expected, countries which score high on this 
composite indicator are likely to be less dependent on foreign relationships and will therefore 
vote in a more autonomous manner. Also, a large budget deficit increases voting coincidence 
for a number of donor countries. External debt, inflation, GDP per capita and GDP growth 
only occasionally enter the regressions with a significant coefficient. With the exception of 
inflation, the results confirm that aid dependence increases voting coincidence, supporting our 
a priori hypothesis. Note that variables related to our other hypotheses, like (change in) total 
aid received (in percent of GNI), change in external debt or ethnic tension, are not selected by 
this general-to-specific approach.  
 
                                                 
14 Clearly, most former colonial powers retain strong ties with their former colonies, so colonies are probably 
more likely to vote in line with their former mother country. Table 4 and the literature reviewed in Section 2 
stress the potential importance of regional clusters for voting alignment. Given the inclusion of fixed effects, we 
cannot test this, but do correct for it.   17
Table 5: General-to-specific results in selecting the baseline model 
CAN FRA GBR DEU ITA JPN USA G7
p-value Hausman test   0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.04
Adj. R
2 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.86 0.92 0.91 0.89 0.93
#Obs 1144 1165 1159 1591 2391 1442 1562 1095
#Cnt 101 102 100 111 141 101 108 97
Period 82-97 82-97 82-97 82-97 73-01 75-00 82-97 82-97
Hypothesis 1: cultural and political proximity
Democracy [t-1] 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.005
(5.59) (5.75) (4.75) (4.18) (8.02) (6.84) (2.58)
Change in democracy 0.005
(2.65)
Political color inline 0.022 0.015 0.016 0.018
(5.52) (5.59) (4.87) (4.86)
Corruption 0.005 0.006 0.008 0.005 0.007
(2.67) (3.23) (3.62) (2.63) (3.49)
Bureaucratic quality -0.007
(-2.16)
Hypothesis 2: dependency on foreign support
National capability -3.812 -7.846 -8.623 -4.811 -4.250 -4.617 -8.203 -7.237
(-2.76) (-5.76) (-6.04) (-2.96) (-4.96) (-5.59) (-6.11) (-5.06)




Budget balance -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(-2.94) (-2.55) (-3.10) (-5.67) (-2.57) (-3.53)




Hypothesis 3: trade flows
Exports from donor 2.361
(2.97)
Imports of donor 4.033 4.952 2.013 1.400 1.823
(3.29) (5.56) (2.50) (3.21) (4.61)  
Notes: sample covers 1970-2002. Country- and time-specific effects are included in all regressions. t-statistics 
are shown in parentheses. To alleviate the interpretation of the estimated coefficients, level variables have been 
lagged by one period in case we allow both levels and first-differences to be included in the most extensive 
specification. 
 
For the relevance of bilateral trade flows we find some support for the hypothesis that 
countries exporting to a donor country vote more in line with the donor. Only in case of Italy, 
countries importing from it vote more in line with Italy as well. There is thus no evidence that   18
economic ties create feelings of exploitation, creating resentment against the trading partner, 
and leading to votes against the partner. The positive effects of interdependence clearly 
dominate here. 
Table 5 shows that the determinants of voting coincidence differ across countries. 
However, for ease of comparison we prefer to have the same baseline model for all countries. 
Given that the evidence in Table 5 is in particular clear for our measures of democracy and 
national capability, we include these two variables in our baseline model.
15  
Table 6 reports the estimation results for our baseline model. Both the level of 
significance and the size of the estimated coefficients are very stable across the different G7 
countries. The (absolute) coefficients for national capability range between 6.48 and 7.93, 
those for democracy between 0.01-0.013, and are all significant at the one percent level. The 
robustness of this baseline model to changes in its specification will be further explored 
below. 
 
Table 6: Results for the baseline model 
CAN FRA GBR DEU ITA JPN USA G7
p-value Hausman test   0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Adj. R
2 0.86 0.89 0.89 0.86 0.87 0.83 0.82 0.89
#Obs 4286 4286 4286 4286 4285 4286 4286 4286
#Cnt 177 177 177 177 177 177 177 177
Period 73-01 73-01 73-01 73-01 73-01 73-01 73-01 73-01
National capability -7.147 -7.506 -7.610 -6.476 -7.304 -7.064 -7.932 -7.686
(-9.98) (-11.29) (-10.62) (-7.34) (-10.28) (-10.26) (-8.90) (-10.70)
Democracy [t-1] 0.013 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.010 0.010 0.012
(16.43) (15.64) (14.95) (12.90) (16.09) (12.68) (9.73) (14.50)  
Notes: sample covers 1970-2002. Country- and time-specific effects are included in all regressions. t-statistics 
are shown in parentheses.  
 
 
                                                 
15 Another more practical reason for not including more variables in the baseline model is that this would reduce 
the number of observations considerably. Including the budget balance, in particular, reduces the number of 
observations in the baseline model by almost half. Including corruption reduces the sample period by more than 
10 years.   19
3. Main hypothesis 
There is ample evidence that G7 countries, and in particular the US, bribe governments to 
vote in line in the General Assembly. As outlined above, G7 countries are in control of IMF 
and Bank decisions, and can thereby use the international organizations to influence recipient 
countries’ behavior in line with their interests.
16 The benefits of bribing governments 
indirectly via IMF and World Bank instead of directly with own aid programs might be 
substantial. It has been argued that national governments delegate unpleasant tasks they 
consider necessary to gain support of interest groups to international organizations (“dirty 
work”). This might allow governments to escape the nationalist resentment those actions 
would create when imposing more direct pressure (Vaubel 1986, 1991, 1996). According to 
Eldar (2004), votes are almost always traded behind the scenes, because most countries prefer 
to conceal vote trading arrangements to escape public and political condemnation. As 
Harrigan, Wang and El-Said (2006) argue, the IMF can impose punishments or rewards much 
wider in scope than any single donor could. Fund and Bank loans are usually much more 
valuable to potential borrowers than they are costly for the US (Eldar 2004). In fact, bilateral 
donors frequently attach their money to IMF programs, substantially increasing the Fund’s 
leverage. Western countries might thus try to influence Fund and Bank to reinforce the 
already existing bilateral pressure.
17 We hypothesize: 
Main Hypothesis: IMF and World Bank programs or loans, or changes in loans, 
increase the probability that a recipient country votes in line with the institutions’ 
major shareholders, the G7 countries. 
To capture the impact of IMF and World Bank, we employ the number of programs 
starting in a certain year. We distinguish the Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) and 
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF), which are highly concessional, and the non-
concessional Extended Fund Facility (EFF) and Stand-By Arrangement (SBA). Net 
                                                 
16 Possible channels for US influence on the IMF have been discussed in detail in Broz and Hawes (2006). They 
argue that US congress is influenced by lobbies with stakes in IMF policy. Congress, in turn, commands the 
allegiance of US officials at the IMF. As the results of their empirical analysis show, a congressperson is more 
likely to vote in favour of an IMF quota increase, the higher have been campaign contributions from big US 
banks and the greater the proportion of winners from the IMF’s pro-globalization mandate in its district. See also 
Bird and Rowlands (2001). 
17 For example, the US promised China supporting its loan request from the World Bank in exchange for support 
of a convention regarding deployment of armed forces in Iraq in the Security Council in 1991 (Eldar 2004).   20
concessional and non-concessional IMF loans agreed and those actually disbursed are also 
included. Regarding the World Bank, we employ technical, adjustment, and all other projects 
starting in a certain year, and new net disbursements of concessional loans (International 
Development Agency, IDA) and non-concessional loans (International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, IBRD) in percent of GDP. 
While we have no a priori hypothesis as to which loans and programs are more likely 
to be used to bribe recipients, there is good reason to separate these facilities in the empirical 
analysis instead of employing one overall variable for IMF and, respectively, World Bank 
involvement. Concessional loans are given to countries with low per capita income only, and 
frequently on a rather continuous basis.
18 Non-concessional programs are usually negotiated 
with more developed countries, which might be better able to resist G7 pressure. In addition, 
those countries might put greater value on their stance in the General Assembly than least 
developed countries do. However, particularly IMF non-concessional loans are frequently 
negotiated quickly at times of severe economic crises, so the recipient might well be forced to 
accept the political strings attached. 
 
3. First results for our main hypothesis 
Aid and loans might not be given to “bribe” governments, but to reward previous voting 
compliance. We thus have to deal with the time structure of our right-hand-side variables. As 
a first step we run correlation analysis allowing for a one year lead or lag in our loan and aid 
variables. Both the dependent and the explanatory variables are first corrected for country- 
and time-specific effects and for the information already contained in the baseline variables. 
To account for the time structure we choose that lead or lag where the correlation with the 
voting coincidence variable is highest.  
Table 7 reports the optimal lead/lag structure for our World Bank and IMF-related 
variables. Most relationships are of a contemporaneous nature. However, of those that are not, 
there are almost as many relationships pointing to a reward structure as there are towards 
bribing votes upfront. In other words, IMF and World Bank involvement might be 
endogenous to General Assembly voting. In the empirical analysis we will work with the time 
                                                 
18 Currently, a 2003 per capita GNI of $895 marks the threshold for concessional IMF and World Bank lending. 
While typical PRGF programs are concluded for 3 years, in practice many countries consecutively negotiate new 
programs for extended periods of time.   21
structures derived here. The issue of potential endogeneity of the IMF and World Bank 
variables will be further addressed in Section 8. 
 
Table 7: Lag-/ Lead-Structure of Loan-related variables 
CAN FRA GBR DEU ITA JPN USA  G7
IMF conc. flows -1 1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
IMF non-conc. flows 1001 1 10
IMF conc. flows agreed 1101 1 11
IMF non-conc. flows agreed -1 -1 0 0 -1 -1 -1 0
IMF SAF & PRGF - 1111 0 00
IMF EFF & SBA -1 -1 0 0 -1 -1 -1 0
IDA flows -1 0 0 0 -1 -1 -1 -1
IBRD flows 1111 1 10
WB techn. projects 0000 0 00
WB adjust. projects 0000 0 - 10








Notes: corrected for country- and time-specific effects and baseline variables. 
 
Table 8 reports the results of our panel regressions when testing our main hypothesis 
for the combined G7 voting coincidence variable. Each column concerns one of the variables 
which might represent these hypotheses. All variables are added individually (with the time 
structure determined above), where national capability and democracy are included in all 
regressions in addition to the fixed time and country effects.  
Concentrating on our main hypothesis, voting coincidence is more likely when non-
concessional IMF flows are higher, higher non-concessional loans are agreed on, or more 
non-concessional IMF (EFF and SBA) programs are in effect. The same is true when more 
World Bank (technical, adjustment, and other) programs and projects are in place. As 
expected, and in line with the program and project variables, new net IBRD loans increase the 
probability that the borrower votes with the average G7 country. The results also show that 
concessional IMF and Bank loans have no significant impact on voting coincidence. As one 
explanation, the G7 countries might not regard the recipients’ votes as being important in the 
General Assembly. For these poor countries, other considerations might be more important in 
determining loan and program allocation. For example, France might want to influence Fund 
and Bank lending in favor of its former colonies, without asking the recipients for voting 
compliance in the Assembly. Alternatively, economic considerations might dominate the 
relations with these poor countries.   22
Recalling the lag structure of Table 7, our results imply that IMF non-concessional 
loan agreements become higher to reward countries for their voting behavior in the UN 
General Assembly. The results imply that one year after demonstrating alliance with the G7 
countries in the Assembly, the probability of receiving greater non-concessional loan 
arrangements is significantly higher. The opposite seems to hold for IMF flows actually 
disbursed and new non-concessional World Bank loans (IBRD flows), where loans seem to be 
disbursed to bribe countries (rather than reward them).  
The baseline variables stay significant at the one percent level in all specifications. 
Again, the estimated coefficients are very robust.  
 
Table 8: Testing the main hypothesis for the G7 as a whole 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
  p-value Hausman test   0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Adj. R
2 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.86 0.86 0.89 0.89 0.86 0.86 0.86
#Obs 4225 4064 4076 4244 3765 3765 4252 4077 3764 3765 3764
#Cnt 177 176 176 177 154 154 177 176 154 154 154
Period 73-01 73-00 73-00 73-01 73-01 73-01 73-01 73-00 73-01 73-01 73-01
Baseline variables
National capability -7.777 -8.048 -8.006 -7.721 -7.366 -7.294 -7.721 -7.837 -7.379 -7.251 -7.231
(-10.76) (-10.60) (-10.57) (-10.73) (-10.29) (-10.21) (-10.73) (-10.42) (-10.31) (-10.13) (-10.07)
Democracy [t-1] 0.012 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.012 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011
(14.35) (13.57) (13.54) (14.41) (14.02) (14.00) (14.50) (13.40) (13.94) (13.90) (13.91)
Main hypothesis: IMF & World Bank support
IMF conc. flows [t-1] 0.094
(0.92)
IMF non-conc. flows [t+1] 0.162
(1.95)
IMF conc. flows agreed [t+1] -0.011
(-0.28)
IMF non-conc. flows agreed [t-1] 0.184
(3.04)
IMF SAF & PRGF [t-1] 0.001
(0.28)
IMF EFF & SBA [t-1] 0.010
(4.23)
IDA flows [t-1] -0.110
(-1.39)
IBRD flows  [t+1] 0.861
(4.75)
WB techn. projects 0.004
(2.04)
WB adjust. projects 0.005
(3.22)
WB other projects (0.00)
(2.28) 
Notes: Country- and time-specific effects are included in all regressions. t-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
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Table 9: Testing the main hypothesis for each G7-members 
  CAN FRA GBR DEU ITA JPN USA  G7
Main hypothesis: IMF & World Bank support
IMF conc. flows 0.173 0.085 0.098 0.098 0.157 0.094 0.045 0.094
(1.71) (0.90) (0.97) (0.79) (1.57) (0.97) (0.36) (0.92)
IMF non-conc. flows 0.219 0.122 0.137 0.222 0.214 0.233 0.097 0.162
(2.68) (1.58) (1.66) (2.17) (2.63) (2.99) (0.97) (1.95)
IMF conc. flows agreed -0.022 -0.021 -0.006 -0.052 -0.040 -0.055 0.011 -0.011
(-0.57) (-0.56) (-0.14) (-1.06) (-1.03) (-1.46) (0.23) (-0.28)
IMF non-conc. flows agreed 0.216 0.202 0.199 0.214 0.232 0.123 0.133 0.184
(3.60) (3.62) (3.31) (2.89) (3.90) (2.14) (1.80) (3.04)
IMF SAF & PRGF 0.002 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.001
(0.56) (0.25) (0.11) (-0.19) (0.13) (0.18) (0.57) (0.28)
IMF EFF & SBA 0.013 0.010 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.008 0.006 0.010
(5.09) (4.67) (4.46) (4.18) (5.16) (3.54) (1.79) (4.23)
IDA flows -0.254 -0.208 -0.124 -0.331 -0.296 -0.207 0.318 -0.110
(-3.21) (-2.82) (-1.57) (-3.39) (-3.77) (-2.74) (3.25) (-1.39)
IBRD flows 0.778 0.748 0.791 1.006 0.836 0.792 0.767 0.861
(4.36) (4.45) (4.38) (4.51) (4.69) (4.65) (3.49) (4.75)
WB techn. projects 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.004
(2.53) (2.63) (2.19) (2.29) (2.62) (1.55) (1.05) (2.04)
WB adjust. projects 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.005
(2.84) (3.61) (3.31) (2.26) (3.07) (1.46) (1.39) (3.22)
WB other projects 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001
(4.80) (2.13) (2.29) (2.75) (3.51) (4.48) (1.41) (2.28)  
Notes: sample covers 1970-2002. Each cell represents one regression in which also country- and time-specific 
effects and baseline variables are included. t-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
 
To see how sensitive our results are with respect to selecting the aggregate G7 as our 
potential donor country, Table 9 summarizes the outcomes of similar analyses for each of the 
members separately. Each column summarizes a similar table as Table 8, i.e. each cell is 
based upon one regression. For ease of comparison, the results for the aggregate G7 – as 
presented in Table 8 – are listed in the last column. 
The results as described above do most of the time also hold for each G7 member. 
However, there are some interesting differences. These differences mainly occur when 
focusing on the US. Here the IMF variables, and in particular IMF non-concessional flows, 
are much less important. Also, World Bank projects are overall less significant for the US. 
The impact of IDA flows on voting coincidence is negative for all G7 countries except the US 
and UK, whereas voting with the US is significantly more likely with more money received 
from the IDA. While the negative impact of IDA flows on voting coincidence is surprising, 
the robustness analysis presented in the next section shows that these results depend on the 
specific specification chosen, and thus on the correlation among the IMF and World Bank   24
variables. The US seems to be primarily using the World Bank whereas other G7 countries 
employ Bank and Fund alike. As a possible explanation, the World Bank President has always 
been American, while the Fund Managing Director has been a European. This might give the 
US more leverage over the Bank as compared to the Fund. 
 
4. Robustness to model specification 
To examine both the sensitivity of our baseline model and the coefficients of our explanatory 
variables of interest to changes in model specification we apply (variants) of the so-called 
Extreme Bounds Analysis (EBA) as suggested by Leamer (1983) and Levine and Renelt 
(1992). These EBA methods will be described below. As the robustness analysis includes the 
donor-specific variables that are important determinants of voting behavior according to Table 
5, the potential problem of neglecting donor-specific variables in our baseline model is 
alleviated. 
4.1 Extreme bounds analysis 
EBA has been widely used in the economic growth literature.
19 The central difficulty in this 
research – which also applies to the research topic of the present paper – is that several 
different models may all seem reasonable given the data, but yield different conclusions about 
the parameters of interest. Indeed, a glance at the studies summarized in Table 1 illustrates 
this point. The results of these studies differ substantially, while most authors do not offer a 
careful analysis to examine how sensitive their conclusions are with respect to model 
specification. As pointed out by Temple (2000), presenting only the results of the model 
preferred by the author can be misleading. The EBA can be exemplified as follows. Equations 
of the following general form are estimated: 
Y = αM + βF + γZ + u, (1) 
where Y is the dependent variable; M is a vector of ‘standard’ explanatory variables; F is the 
variable of interest; Z is a vector of up to three possible additional explanatory variables, 
which according to the literature may be related to the dependent variable; and u is an error 
term. The extreme bounds test for variable F states that if the lower extreme bound for β – i.e. 
the lowest value for β minus two standard deviations – is negative, while the upper extreme 
bound for β – i.e. the highest value for β plus two standard deviations – is positive, the 
variable F is not robustly related to Y. 
                                                 
19 See, e.g. Levine and Renelt (1992), Sala-i-Martin (1997a, 1997b), Temple (1998, 2000), Fernández, Ley and 
Steel (2001), Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer and Miller (2004) and Sturm and de Haan (2005).   25
As argued by Temple (2000), it is rare in empirical research that we can say with 
certainty that one model dominates all other possibilities in all dimensions. In these 
circumstances, it makes sense to provide information about how sensitive the findings are to 
alternative modeling choices. The EBA provides a relatively simple means of doing exactly 
this. Still, the EBA has been criticized in the literature. Sala-i-Martin (1997a, 1997b) argues 
that the test applied in the Extreme Bounds Analysis poses too rigid a threshold in most cases. 
If the distribution of β has some positive and some negative support, then one is bound to find 
at least one regression for which the estimated coefficient changes sign if enough regressions 
are run. We will therefore not only report the extreme bounds, but also the percentage of the 
regressions in which the coefficient of the variable F is significantly different from zero at the 
5 percent level. Moreover, instead of analyzing just the extreme bounds of the estimates of the 
coefficient of a particular variable, we follow Sala-i-Martin’s (1997a, 1997b) suggestion to 
analyze the entire distribution. Following this suggestion, we not only report the unweighted 
parameter estimate of β and its standard deviation but also the unweighted cumulative 
distribution function (CDF(0)), i.e. the fraction of the cumulative distribution function lying 
on one side of zero. We will base our conclusions on the Sala-i-Martin variant of the EBA.
20  
4.1 EBA Results 
Table 10 presents the results of the Extreme Bounds Analysis for the individual G7 countries 
and the weighted average.
21 Besides the fixed country and time effects only national 
capability and the index for democracy are included in the base model (M). As explained 
above, the variables used to test our hypotheses have then been added to the F-vector one at a 
time. Using the set of 27 remaining variables (which enter the Z-vector) the above-described 
EBA approach is employed to get a clearer picture of the robustness of the F-variable.  
 
                                                 
20 Sala-i-Martin (1997a) proposes using the (integrated) likelihood to construct a weighted CDF(0). However, 
the varying number of observations in the regressions due to missing observations in some of the variables poses 
a problem. Sturm and de Haan (2001) show that as a result this goodness of fit measure may not be a good 
indicator of the probability that a model is the true model and the weights constructed in this way are not 
equivariant for linear transformations in the dependent variable. Hence, changing scales will result in rather 
different outcomes and conclusions. We therefore restrict our attention to the unweighted version. Furthermore, 
for technical reasons – in particular our unbalanced panel setup – we are unable to use the extension of this 
approach called Bayesian Averaging of Classical Estimates (BACE) as introduced by Sala-i-Martin, 
Doppelhofer and Miller (2004). 
21 See Sturm, Berger and de Haan (2005) for a recent analysis regarding the determinants of IMF loans.   26
Table 10: Significance in the EBA analysis 
  
 CAN FRA GBR DEU ITA JPN USA G7 CAN FRA GBR DEU ITA JPN USA G7
Baseline variables    
National capability 74 92 89 70 80 92 93 79 0.93 0.99 0.99 0.90 0.96 1.00 0.99 0.97
Democracy [-1] 98 90 89 100 99 97 61 81 1.00 0.98 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.94 0.96
Main hypothesis: IMF & World Bank support
IMF conc. flows 38 5 1 18 32 21 2 4 0.91 0.75 0.73 0.82 0.91 0.90 0.73 0.74
IMF non-conc. flows 21 24 20 6 15 29 12 20 0.81 0.82 0.81 0.80 0.83 0.84 0.80 0.79
IMF conc. flows agreed 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0.62 0.62 0.67 0.67 0.66 0.69 0.66 0.60
IMF non-conc. flows agreed 37 41 53 43 52 16 4 51 0.89 0.92 0.91 0.87 0.93 0.81 0.72 0.92
IMF SAF & PRGF 11 4 4 0 2 5 9 3 0.82 0.85 0.86 0.66 0.85 0.83 0.81 0.84
IMF EFF & SBA 62 51 54 45 75 48 1 55 0.96 0.93 0.93 0.89 0.97 0.93 0.76 0.93
IDA flows 17 11 4 18 13 12 20 7 0.80 0.78 0.71 0.84 0.77 0.81 0.79 0.74
IBRD flows 25 33 35 27 26 34 91 41 0.82 0.90 0.92 0.87 0.86 0.89 0.99 0.93
WB techn. projects 15 60 23 8 37 2 1 11 0.86 0.97 0.89 0.91 0.94 0.74 0.80 0.85
WB adjust. projects 96 98 97 75 100 51 11 81 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.98 1.00 0.96 0.89 0.98
WB other projects 28 17 15 31 22 42 13 15 0.81 0.77 0.77 0.83 0.80 0.90 0.91 0.75
Percentage regressions significant at 5 % level CDF(0)
 
Notes: sample covers 1973-2001. Country- and time-specific effects and baseline variables are included in all 
regressions. Each cell in this table is based upon 4525 regressions in case of the baseline variables, or 435 
regressions for the variables testing our main hypotheses. 
 
The left-hand side of Table 10 shows how often the particular variable testing one of 
our main hypothesis has been significant at the 5 percent level of significance in the close to 
3’700 regressions we ran for each of them. The right-hand side of the table reports the 
percentage of the unweighted cumulative distribution function lying on one side of zero. 
Hence, Table 10 gives an overview of the statistical significance of each variable.  
Table 11, on the other hand, is useful to explore the impact of each variable on voting 
behavior. It reports in the first column the average value of each variable and its standard 
error as used in the baseline model. The next seven columns contain the average estimated 
coefficient (and its standard deviation). The final column reports the impact of a one standard 
error shock for G7 voting coincidence. 
As can be seen from the tables (and due to the high correlation among the dependent 
variables), the pattern of significant variables is fairly similar among the seven countries and 
their weighted average. Again the only significant differences appear to be between the US 
and the remaining G7 countries. Generally, voting with the G7 is robustly more likely for 
more democratic countries and with lower levels of national capability. The results are more 
or less in line with the individual panel regressions reported above. Most notably, the results 
obtained for IMF and World Bank are robustly related to voting, with four variables showing 
a CDF(0) greater than 0.90 in the EBA referring to the G7 variable, and similar results for the 
individual country regressions (excluding the US). The coefficients of these variables are also 
in line with those presented above and have the highest overall impact on voting coincidence 
of all variables used to test our main hypothesis. According to the results, a one standard   27
deviation increase in IMF non-concessional loans agreed increases voting coincidence by 0.19 
percent. The respective increase is 0.19 percent for Extended Fund Facility and Stand-By 
programs, 0.17 percent for IBRD flows, and 0.23 percent for World Bank adjustment projects. 
 
Table 11: Impact according to EBA analysis 
 Sample  Impact
 Avg. CAN FRA GBR DEU ITA JPN USA G7 G7
Baseline variables      
National capability 0.004 -3.417 -4.273 -4.381 -3.096 -3.764 -3.800 -5.629 -4.461 -5.16%
(0.012) (0.806) (0.760) (0.811) (1.013) (0.811) (0.769) (1.107) (0.839)
Democracy [-1] 3.862 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.008 0.008 0.006 0.003 0.006 1.20%
(2.011) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Main hypothesis: IMF & World Bank support
IMF conc. flows 0.001 0.172 0.095 0.089 0.135 0.164 0.163 -0.097 0.017 0.01%
(0.007) (0.110) (0.115) (0.118) (0.151) (0.112) (0.116) (0.143) (0.123)
IMF non-conc. flows 0.001 0.091 0.079 0.083 0.101 0.106 0.107 0.102 0.077 0.07%
(0.009) (0.088) (0.084) (0.090) (0.115) (0.091) (0.088) (0.112) (0.095)
IMF conc. flows agreed 0.002 0.006 -0.012 0.019 -0.020 -0.008 -0.014 -0.022 -0.005 -0.01%
(0.019) (0.041) (0.044) (0.044) (0.057) (0.042) (0.041) (0.053) (0.045)
IMF non-conc. flows agreed 0.003 0.103 0.111 0.135 0.148 0.128 0.057 0.025 0.147 0.19%
(0.013) (0.061) (0.059) (0.071) (0.090) (0.063) (0.059) (0.079) (0.076)
IMF SAF & PRGF 0.044 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.002 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.09%
(0.204) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
IMF EFF & SBA 0.126 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.005 0.002 0.006 0.19%
(0.331) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
IDA flows 0.005 0.026 -0.060 -0.009 -0.162 -0.029 0.040 0.123 -0.008 -0.01%
(0.013) (0.103) (0.096) (0.104) (0.128) (0.104) (0.098) (0.132) (0.108)
IBRD flows 0.001 0.236 0.288 0.313 0.338 0.273 0.290 0.663 0.378 0.17%
(0.004) (0.180) (0.172) (0.182) (0.228) (0.184) (0.172) (0.229) (0.190)
WB techn. projects 0.134 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.10%
(0.392) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
WB adjust. projects 0.192 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.23%
(0.537) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
WB other projects 1.444 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.08%
(2.237) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Voting coincidence 0.558 0.468 0.457 0.526 0.543 0.582 0.295 0.458
(0.122) (0.129) (0.139) (0.151) (0.129) (0.107) (0.135) (0.138)
Average beta (standard deviation)
Sample average (standard error)
 
Notes: sample covers 1970-2002. Country- and time-specific effects and baseline variables are included in all 
regressions. The first column reports the sample average (and standard error) for each variable. The final column 
shows the estimated average impact of a shock of one standard error in each variable on G7 voting coincidence 
in percentage points.  
 
All this makes us confident that all G7 countries – with the exception of the US – can 
be well-described by a model including, besides our baseline variables, IMF non-concessional 
flows and programs and World Bank adjustment projects. For the US, the results point to 
including concessional and non-concessional flows besides the baseline variables. Table 12 
reports the results of an extended model, containing these variables in addition to the baseline. 
The results show that World Bank adjustment projects are no robust determinant of voting in 
line with the US.  
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Table 12: Testing the extended models 
  CAN FRA GBR DEU ITA JPN USA G7 USA
  
  p-value Hausman test   0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Adj. R
2 0.82 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.84 0.82 0.79 0.86 0.82
#Obs 3578 3578 3578 3578 3578 3578 3578 3578 4245
#Cnt 154 154 154 154 154 154 154 154 177
Period 73-00 73-00 73-00 73-00 73-00 73-00 73-00 73-00 73-01
Baseline variables
National capability -6.753 -6.928 -7.412 -6.484 -6.925 -6.499 -7.896 -7.378 -7.566
(-9.06) (-10.16) (-9.92) (-7.66) (-9.37) (-9.24) (-8.40) (-9.86) (-8.61)
Democracy [-1] 0.012 0.010 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.009 0.009 0.011 0.010
(14.21) (13.76) (12.91) (12.74) (14.02) (11.49) (8.44) (12.62) (9.60)
Main hypothesis: IMF & World Bank support
IMF EFF & SBA [-1] 0.011 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.007 0.005 0.008
(4.28) (3.67) (3.54) (3.30) (4.17) (2.89) (1.51) (3.29)
IBRD flows [1] / [0] 0.701 0.636 0.717 0.770 0.720 0.620 0.783 0.772 0.921
(3.94) (3.91) (4.02) (3.81) (4.09) (3.69) (3.49) (4.33) (4.21)
WB adjust. projects 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.005
(2.46) (3.34) (3.10) (1.97) (2.72) (1.17) (1.53) (3.03)
IDA flows [-1] 0.351
(3.58) 
Notes: sample covers 1970-2002. Country- and time-specific effects are included in all regressions. t-statistics 
are shown in parentheses. 
 
As a next step we further elaborate on this extended model. Due to space restraints, we 
will restrict ourselves to the last two columns of Table 12, i.e. the US and the average G7 – as 
representing the other G7 member countries.  
 
5. Further robustness checks to the extended model 
As described above, the definition of the voting coincidence variable varied in the previous 
literature. We therefore test the robustness of our results to changes in this definition. We also 
test whether a moving average version of voting coincidence, the exclusion of non-key votes, 
the exclusion of almost unanimous votes or the exclusion of Israeli topics affects our results. 
There has also been some discussion about whether the end of the Cold War 
introduced a structural shift in countries’ positions in the Assembly (see, e.g. Voeten 2000). 
Arguably, the determinants of voting in the General Assembly need not be constant over the 
30 years under study. The IMF’s support for countries with strong ties to the US, but lacking 
effective reform programs, was particularly pronounced in the Cold War era (Krueger 1998, 
Bordo and James 2000). Regarding the strategic importance of multilateral loans, this shift 
might be important. During the Cold War, pressure by both the West and the East on non-  29
aligned countries was rather open and direct. Comparably obvious direct pressure might not 
be tolerated by the international community today. In addition, after the end of the Cold War 
countries are less constrained by alignments and might thus be more likely to vote according 
to their preferences when not being bribed. Particularly, economically weak countries no 
longer need protection by “their” bloc and now need to be bribed to achieve alignment. To 
capture this break, we therefore replicated the models allowing the coefficients to differ for 
the periods before 1991 and after 1990.
22
Finally, we also replicate the analysis omitting those countries that never received IMF 
or, respectively, World Bank loans.  
 















































































































































































      
Adj. R
2 0.86 0.65 0.64 0.87 0.71 0.80 0.83 0.86 0.86
#Obs 3578 3578 3578 3395 2460 3578 3578 2882 3105
#Cnt 154 154 154 152 154 154 154 120 131
Period 73-00 73-00 73-00 73-00 83-00 73-00 73-00 73-00 73-00
IMF EFF & SBA [-1] 0.008 0.013 0.011 0.009 0.016 0.009 0.008 0.003 0.002 0.008 0.008
(3.29) (2.66) (2.63) (4.28) (2.48) (3.52) (2.78) (0.96) (3.17) (3.05) (3.06)
IBRD flows [1] 0.772 0.932 0.496 0.694 0.429 0.914 0.856 0.403 1.535 0.746 0.753
(4.33) (2.72) (1.63) (4.67) (0.91) (4.74) (4.22) (1.84) (3.66) (4.06) (4.19)
WB adjust. projects 0.005 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.011 0.005 0.005 0.001 0.007 0.004 0.005
(3.03) (1.40) (0.88) (2.48) (2.98) (3.07) (2.46) (0.36) (2.14) (2.65) (2.95)
Adj. R
2 0.82 0.81 0.78 0.88 0.75 0.81 0.84 0.75 0.76
#Obs 4245 4245 4245 4042 2955 4245 4245 2996 3229
#Cnt 177 177 177 173 177 177 177 120 131
Period 73-01 73-01 73-01 73-01 83-01 73-01 73-01 73-01 73-01
IDA flows [-1] 0.351 -0.206 -0.318 0.241 0.470 0.265 0.166 0.307 0.070 0.395 0.395
(3.58) (-2.17) (-3.69) (3.04) (2.46) (2.52) (1.68) (2.09) (0.42) (3.81) (3.86)
IBRD flows [0] 0.921 0.380 0.470 0.939 1.029 1.129 0.935 0.646 0.619 0.963 0.943















Notes: Baseline variables, country- and time-specific effects are included in all regressions. t-statistics are shown 
in parentheses. 
                                                 
22 Harrigan, Wang and El-Said (2006) argue that the post 9/11 concerns of Western countries might intensify 
their willingness of employing aid as a tool of foreign policy. As Harrigan et al. remark, the US explicitly states 
that the War on Terror and US security are important reasons for foreign aid. They cite President G.W. Bush 
speaking at the UN meeting in Monterrey that “we fight poverty because hope is an answer to terror.” The 2001 
terrorist attacks might thus have introduced another structural break. However, as we hardly have data for the 
post 9/11 period, we cannot test for this.   30
Table 13 presents the results. The first column replicates the extended model of Table 
12 for the G7 and the USA. The remaining columns check the sensitivity of these results. As 
can be seen, using alternative dependent variables rarely changes the results for the average 
G7 variable. According to all definitions of the dependent variable, the number of non-
concessional IMF programs increase voting coincidence, with coefficients at least at the five 
percent level. The impact of non-concessional World Bank money remains significant at the 
one percent level in most regressions. The exception are the regressions focusing on key votes 
only, where the coefficient is insignificant, and the Kegley-Hook specification, where the 
coefficient remains, however, marginally significant. Turning to adjustment programs 
financed by the World Bank the table shows that the result remains in four out of six 
regressions. Only changing the dependent variable according to the definition of Barro-Lee 
and Kegley-Hook changes the previous result. In summary, the main results are fairly robust 
as to how the dependent variable is defined and which votes are included.  
Table 13 also tests whether the results differ for the periods before and after 1991. The 
regression thus interacts the IMF and World Bank variables with a dummy for the post-1991 
period. Jointly, the IMF and World Bank variables and their respective interaction are 
significant at least at the five percent level in each regression. The results show that the 
impact of the Financial Institutions on voting coincidence has indeed changed over time. 
Regarding the weighted G7 variable, the impact of the Fund and Bank becomes much 
stronger after 1991. In the post-1991 period, all three coefficients show that there has been a 
significant increase in the impact of both Financial Institutions. The evidence thus supports 
the hypothesis that the role of politics in General Assembly voting became stronger with the 
end of the Cold War. Most likely, the role of indirect pressure became more important, as 
open pressure on other governments is no longer tolerated by voters in G7 countries. The 
table also shows that the exclusion of countries never receiving IMF or, respectively, World 
Bank loans does not change the previous results. 
Turning to the sensitivity of the dependent variable for the extended US-model, the 
results are again extremely robust to our tests. However, in contrast to the results for the 
average G7 country, the impact of the World Bank on voting with the US does not change 
over time. The coefficients of IDA and IBRD flows are smaller in the period up until 1990 as 
compared to the full sample, but stay significant at the five percent level.  
As another important issue, clearly, the analysis so far does neglect the potential 
endogeneity of IMF and World Bank involvement. To deal with this, we employ the GMM 
estimator as suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991). This estimator first-differences the   31
estimating equation and uses lags of the dependent variable from at least the previous two 
periods as well as lags of the exogenous variables as instruments. Since there are more 
instruments than right-hand side variables, the equations are over-identified and the 
instruments must be appropriately weighted. We present results from the Arellano-Bond one-
step estimator, which uses the identity matrix as the weighting matrix. The two-step estimator 
weights the instruments asymptotically efficiently using the one-step estimates. However, in 
limited samples like the one used here, standard errors tend to be under-estimated by the two-
step estimator (Arellano and Bond 1991: 291). In all estimations we treat the covariates as 
strictly exogenous. For the GMM estimator, we conduct a Sargan test on the validity of the 
instruments used. This amounts to a test for the exogeneity of the covariates. We also report 
results of the Arellano-Bond test of second order autocorrelation, which must be absent from 
the data in order for the estimator to be consistent. 
 
Table 14: Testing the main hypothesis for G7 and US, GMM 
G7 USA
# Countries 152 173
# Observations 3394 4033
Period 1975-2000 1975-2000
Lagged dependent variable 0.488 0.404
(23.48) (20.59)
National capability -3.697 -4.673
(2.91) (2.84)
Democracy (t-1) -0.001 0.001
(1.10) (0.47)
IMF EFF & SBA (t-1) -0.002
(0.77)




WB adj. Projects 0.003
(2.03)
IDA flows [t-1] 0.286
(2.43)
 
Notes: Time-specific effects are included in all regressions. t-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
 
Table 14 shows the results for the G7 and the US. As can be seen, most results are not 
qualitatively affected by the potential endogeneity of the Financial Institution variables. The 
exception is IMF programs that do no longer significantly determine voting with the G7. The   32
quantitative impact of the World Bank variables decreases when those variables are 
instrumented – but still remain quantitatively important. The Sargan test accepts the 
instruments at the one percent level in both specifications. However, the Arellano-Bond test 
rejects the hypothesis of no second order autocorrelation. We therefore include a second lag 
of the dependent variable to the regressions (not reported in the table). As it turns out, both 
specification tests accept the instrument when the second lag is included, while the results are 
qualitatively unchanged. 
To summarize, our results seem to be extremely robust to changes in the definition of 
the dependent variable, changes in the sample, and method of estimation. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The paper empirically analyzed the influence of the IMF and the World Bank on voting 
patterns in the UN General Assembly, and tested the robustness of previous studies’ findings 
on the relationship between aid and voting. The main hypotheses tested relate to the impact of 
IMF and World Bank loans and programs. Our results, based on a huge number of different 
regression specifications and Extreme Bounds Analysis for a sample of up to 188 countries 
over the period 1970-2002, show that IMF and World Bank indeed influence voting in the UN 
General Assembly. 
While the exact results depend on how voting coincidence is defined, and which 
control variables are included in the regressions, countries receiving adjustment programs and 
larger non-concessional loans from the World Bank vote more frequently in line with the 
average G7 country. The same is true for countries receiving non-concessional IMF programs. 
Regarding voting coincidence with the US, World Bank (concessional and non-concessional) 
loans have a significant impact, while IMF loans and programs have not. The US thus seems 
to be primarily using the World Bank whereas other G7 countries employ Bank and Fund 
alike. The World Bank President has always been American, while the Fund Managing 
Director has been a European. The US might thus have more leverage over the Bank as 
compared to the Fund. As another interesting result of our analysis, the role of politics in 
General Assembly voting became stronger with the end of the Cold War for the average G7 
country, but not for the US.  
The empirical results lend support to the recent proposals by the British central bank 
governor Mervyn King, suggesting to give greater independence to the IMF. With an 
independent Executive Board, the political influence of the major shareholders is likely to be 
substantially reduced. The influence of governments could also be reduced by transferring the   33
control of international organizations to the member countries’ citizens, as recently discussed 
in Frey and Stutzer (2006a, 2006b) and Tullock (2006). According to Frey and Stutzer, a 
representative sample of trustees should be chosen among the citizenry of the member states. 
The trustees can launch initiatives, vote in referenda on issues related to the organizations and 
would be allowed to recall the institutions’ executives. If governments use Fund and Bank to 
hide their political motives from their voters, clearly, direct citizen control could solve the 
issue. 
   Regarding  bilateral  grants from G7 countries, our results show that there is no robust 
link between grants and voting in the General Assembly. Given the robust and significant 
impact of IMF and World Bank on voting coincidence, this is surprising. As one explanation, 
more money might be needed than can be provided by any individual bilateral donor alone. 
We also hypothesized that G7 countries might prefer indirect pressure on other governments 
over direct pressure. This provides a second explanation for our results. Finally, aggregated 
grant flows might measure foreign influence too imprecisely. Specific categories of aid are 
better suited to buy political support from the recipient countries than others. Emergency 
relief, for example, is unlikely to be given for political reasons and might add too much noise 
to aggregate grant flows, hiding the potential impact on voting behavior. Analyzing the 
impact of disaggregated bilateral aid flows provides an avenue for future research.    34
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Appendix I: Data description and sources 
Abbreviation Description Source
Voting coincidence
Voting coincidence Percentage of votes within a year which are inline with 
one of the G7 member countries.
Voeten (2004)
Main hypothesis: IMF & World Bank support
IMF conc. flows Net IMF financing (concessional) (as % of GDP) IMF (2004)
IMF non-conc. flows Net IMF financing (nonconcessional) (as % of GDP) IMF (2004)
IMF conc. flows agreed Agreed IMF financing (concessional) (as % of GDP) IMF (2004)
IMF non-conc. flows agreed Agreed IMF financing (nonconcesional) (as % of GDP) IMF (2004)
IMF EFF & SBA Start of a IMF EFF and/or SBA program in that year (non-
cons.)
IMF annual reports, various years
IMF SAF & PRGF Start of a IMF SAF and/or PRGF program in that year 
(cons.)
IMF annual reports, various years
IDA flows IDA (NFL, as % of GDP) World Bank (2004)
IBRD flows Net financial flows, IBRD (as % of GDP) World Bank (2004)
WB techn. projects Number of World Bank technical loan programs starting 
that year (non-conc.)
www.worldbank.org
WB adjust. projects Number of World Bank adjustment programs starting that 
year (non-cons.)
www.worldbank.org
WB other projects Number of other World Bank programs starting that year 
(non-conc.)
www.worldbank.org
Hypothesis 1: cultural and political proximity
Democracy 8 - (Political rights index + Civil liberties index ) / 2 Freedom House (2004)
Change in democracy Change in Democracy Freedom House (2004)
Rule of law Rule of law (law and order tradition) indicator International Country Risk Guide Data
Corruption Indicator for corruption in government International Country Risk Guide Data
Bureaucratic quality Indicator for bureaucratic quality International Country Risk Guide Data
Political color inline Chief Executive's Party in recipient and donor country 
both either Right or Left (L)
Beck et al. (2001)
Hypothesis 2: dependency on foreign support
Aid Aid (as % of GNI) World Bank (2005)
Change in aid Change in aid (as % of GNI) World Bank (2005)
National capability Composite Indicator of National Capability (v3.01) Singer et al. (1972)
external debt Total external debt corrected for the use of IMF credit, 
IBRD loans and IDA credits (as % of GDP)
World Bank (2005)
Change in external debt Change in Total external debt corrected for the use of 
IMF credit, IBRD loans and IDA credits (as % of GDP)
World Bank (2005)
Ethnic tension Presence of ethnic tensions International Country Risk Guide Data
Inflation Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) (=π/1+π) World Bank (2005)
Current account balance Current account balance (% of GDP)  World Bank (2005)
Budget balance Overall budget balance, including grants (% of GDP)  World Bank (2005)
GDP per capita   Log of GDP per capita (constant 1995 US$)   World Bank (2005)
GDP growth real GDP growth (annual %)  World Bank (2005)
Hypothesis 3: trade flows
Exports from donor Exports from donor country (as % recipient GDP) OECD Stat. Compendium
Imports of donor Imports of donor country (as % recipient GDP) OECD Stat. Compendium
Hypothesis 4: bilateral aid
Net grants from donor Net Grants  (as % recipient GDP) OECD Stat. Compendium
Change net grants donor Change in Net Grants  (x1,000 and as % recipient GDP) OECD Stat. Compendium  CESifo Working Paper Series 
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